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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
The primary issue for decision is whether we should 
overrule the holding of Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d 
Cir. 1997), interpreting 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Under this 
statute, popularly known as the "three strikes" rule, a 
prisoner may not file a new action or appeal in forma 
pauperis ("I.F.P.") if, on thr ee or more prior occasions while 
incarcerated or detained, the prisoner has br ought a federal 
action or appeal that was dismissed on the gr ounds that it 
was frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim, unless the 
prisoner "is under imminent danger of serious physical 
injury." We held in Gibbs that"imminent danger" is 
measured at the time of the alleged incident, not at the 
time the complaint is filed. 116 F.3d at 86. Three of our 
sister courts of appeals have since rejected our teachings in 
Gibbs, holding instead that the court should assess 
"imminent danger" as of the time the prisoner's complaint 
is filed and that a prisoner's allegation that he faced danger 
in the past is insufficient to allow him to pr oceed I.F.P. 
Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Banos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884-885 (5th Cir. 1998). We 
now abandon the interpretation set forth in Gibbs and 
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adopt that of our sister courts of appeals. W e hold also that 
S 1915(g), as so interpreted, is constitutional. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant Debro Siddiq Abdul-Akbar was most r ecently 
incarcerated by the Delaware Department of Corrections 
from June 10, 1994 through May 15, 1999 on state charges 
including robbery, conspiracy, assault and shoplifting. 
During the time material to Appellant's underlying 
proposed Complaint based on 42 U.S.C. S 1983, he was 
incarcerated at the Sussex Correctional Institute in 
Georgetown, Delaware. On May 17, 1999, Appellant 
reported to a community confinement center , and on May 
27, 1999, he was released from the custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
 
Appellant has filed at least 180 civil rights or habeas 
corpus claims. Abdul-Akbar v. Dept. of Corr ections, 910 F. 
Supp. 986, 998 (D. Del. 1995). In Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 
901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990), this court reviewed a district 
court order barring Appellant from filing any further S 1983 
claims I.F.P. and held that a district court may enter an 
injunction precluding a prisoner fromfiling any S1983 
claims without leave of court and without making certain 
good faith certifications. 901 F.2d at 333. We stated that 
Abdul-Akbar's "history of repetitious and frivolous filings 
indicates a clear intent to abuse the courts and the I.F.P. 
process." Id. at 334. An injunction subsequently was 
entered by the district court. Abdul-Akbar v. Dept. of 
Corrections, 910 F. Supp. at 1009. 
 
On February 10, 1998, Appellant filed a motion for leave 
to file a S 1983 Complaint, a proposed Complaint and a 
motion to proceed I.F.P. The pr oposed Complaint alleged 
that on or about January 9, 1998, prison officials 
arbitrarily sprayed Appellant with pepper gas and r efused 
to provide him with medical treatment even though they 
knew that he suffers from asthma. Appellant also claimed 
that certain prison officials violated his civil rights by 
belonging to a racist organization, that one defendant failed 
to investigate properly the pepper spray incident, and that 
the district court judge violated his Sixth Amendment right 
 
                                4 
  
of access to the courts by preventing his complaints from 
being heard. 
 
The district court denied the motion to proceed I.F.P., 
reasoning that (1) Appellant had brought actions that the 
court had dismissed as frivolous on more than three prior 
occasions, and (2) he did not claim to be in imminent 
danger of serious physical injury. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction because an order 
denying leave to proceed I.F.P. is a final, collateral order 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The appeal was timely 
filed. This court reviews de novo issues of statutory 
interpretation, Pennsylvania Mines Corp. v. Holland, 197 
F.3d 114, 119 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999), and the constitutionality 
of a statute, DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F .3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
II. 
 
The discretionary power to permit indigent plaintiffs to 
proceed without first paying a filing fee was initially codified 
in the federal statutes in 1892. See Act of July 20, 1892, 
ch. 209 1-5, 27 Stat. 252. Congress enacted the I.F.P. 
statute, currently codified at 28 U.S.C.S 1915, "to ensure 
that administrative court costs and filing fees, both of 
which must be paid by everyone else who files a lawsuit, 
would not prevent indigent persons from pursuing 
meaningful litigation." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 
1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 
U.S. 25, 31 (1992)). Congress was also awar e of the 
potential for abuse, and it included a subsection allowing 
for dismissal of frivolous or malicious actions. Denton, 504 
U.S. at 31. 
 
Congress subsequently enacted the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act ("PLRA" or "Act"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 
Stat. 1321 (1996), largely in response to concerns about the 
heavy volume of frivolous prisoner litigation in the federal 
courts. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01, S14413 (daily ed. 
Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (explaining that the 
number of prisoner suits filed "has grown astronomically-- 
from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 1994"). In 
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enacting the PLRA, Congress concluded that the large 
number of meritless prisoner claims was caused by the fact 
that prisoners easily obtained I.F.P. status and hence were 
not subject to the same economic disincentives tofiling 
meritless cases that face other civil litigants. See 141 Cong. 
Rec. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement 
of Sen. Kyl) ("Filing frivolous civil rights lawsuits has 
become a recreational activity for long-term residents of 
prisons."); 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7524 (daily ed. May 
25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[P]risoners will now 
`litigate at the drop of a hat,' simply because they have little 
to lose and everything to gain."). To curb this trend, the 
PLRA instituted a number of reforms in the handling of 
prisoner litigation. 
 
Among other things, the PLRA amended the I.F .P. statute 
as it applies to prisoners. Under the statute as amended, a 
prisoner who is allowed to proceed I.F.P . is not excused 
from paying filing fees, but is only excused from pre-paying 
them in full if they meet certain criteria. The PLRA now 
requires prisoners who qualify for I.F .P. status to pay by 
way of an initial partial fee, followed by installment 
payments until the entire fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. S 1915(b)(1). 
Congress also added S 1915(g), the "three strikes rule," 
which limits a prisoner's ability to proceed I.F.P. if the 
prisoner abuses the judicial system by filing frivolous 
actions. Prisoners may avoid the limitation in this 
provision, however, if they are under "imminent danger of 
serious physical injury." 
 
This appeal requires us to decide when the existence of 
"imminent danger" is to be assessed; specifically, whether it 
is assessed as of the time the complaint is filed, or at some 
time in the past, even though that danger no longer exists 
when the complaint is filed. 
 
Today we abandon the rule announced in Gibbs that 
"imminent danger" is assessed at the time of the alleged 
incident. We adopt, instead, the construction set forth by 
the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
that a prisoner may invoke the "imminent danger" 
exception only to seek relief from a danger which is 
"imminent" at the time the complaint is filed. We conclude 
that this interpretation is consistent with the plain 
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language of S 1915(g), with congressional intent and with 
the legislative purpose of the PLRA as a whole. 
 
III. 
 
This is a case of statutory construction, and we begin our 
analysis with the language of S 1915(g): 
 
        In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
        appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under 
        this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or mor e prior 
        occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 
        facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
        United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 
        it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 
        which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
        under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
 
A. 
 
We now apply settled precepts of statutory construction 
and take as our beginning point a recognition that from the 
earliest times, we have adopted what is called the American 
Plain Meaning Rule exemplified in Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (internal citations 
omitted): 
 
        It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must, 
        in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
        which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the 
        law is within the constitutional authority of the law- 
        making body which passed it, the sole function of the 
        courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Where the 
        language is plain and admits of no more than one 
        meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and 
        the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no 
        discussion. 
 
In 1993, the Court made a modern statement of the plain 
meaning rule: "Our task is to give effect to the will of 
Congress, and where its will has been expr essed in 
reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive." Negonsett v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 
104 (1993). If the language of the statute is plain, the sole 
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function of the court is to enforce the statute according to 
its terms. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 241 (1989). The plain meaning is conclusive, therefore, 
"except in the `rare cases [in which] the literal application 
of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters.' " Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982)). 
 
B. 
 
We now apply the ordinary meaning of the words chosen 
by Congress in drafting S 1915(g). The phrase "in no event" 
simply means "may not." This court has pr eviously held 
that the word "bring" in this context plainly refers to the 
time when the civil action is initiated. Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 
F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1998). Putting the phrases together, 
the first clause of S 1915(g) obviously means "a prisoner 
may not file a new civil complaint." In the or dinary sense of 
the words, this clause refers temporally to the time the new 
complaint is filed. The clause "unless he is in imminent 
danger of serious physical injury" is an exception to the 
preclusive effect of the statute. But the exception is cast in 
the present tense, not in the past tense, and the word "is" 
in the exception refers back to the same point in time as 
the first clause, i.e., the time of filing. The statute 
contemplates that the "imminent danger" will exist 
contemporaneously with the bringing of the action. 
Someone whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be 
described as someone who "is" in danger , nor can that past 
danger reasonably be described as "imminent." The court 
so held in Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F .3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 
1998): 
 
        As the statute's use of the present tense verbs`bring' 
        and `is' demonstrates, an otherwise ineligible prisoner 
        is only eligible to proceed IFP if he is in imminent 
        danger at the time of filing. Allegations that the 
        prisoner has faced imminent danger in the past ar e 
        insufficient to trigger this exception to S 1915(g) and 
        authorize the prisoner to pay the filing fee on the 
        installment plan. 
 
See also Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 
1999) ("Congress' use of the present tense in S 1915(g) 
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confirms that a prisoner's allegation that he faced imminent 
danger sometime in the past is an insufficient basis to 
allow him to proceed in forma pauperis . . . ."); Banos v. 
O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir . 1998) ("[T]he language 
of S 1915(g), by using the present tense, clearly refers to the 
time when the action or appeal is filed or the motion for IFP 
status is made."). Taking both clauses together, the statute 
plainly means that a prisoner is not permitted to file his 
complaint unless he is, at that time, under imminent 
danger. Viewed from the Plain Meaning Rule, we interpret 
"is under imminent danger" to relate to the time when "a 
prisoner bring[s] a civil action." 
 
IV. 
 
Reinforcing the interpretation of the statute by 
application of the Plain Meaning Rule is an analysis of 
language found in other portions of the PLRA. For example, 
another section of the Act, S 1915(b)(4), pr ovides: 
 
        In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing 
        a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment 
        for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 
        means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1915(b)(4) (emphasis added). As in subsection 
(g), this provision begins with the exhortation"in no event 
shall," and, as in subsection (g), it describes a necessary 
condition by using the present tense of the operative verb. 
Section 1915(b)(4) plainly means that the courts may not 
prohibit a prisoner from filing a new complaint for the 
reason that he does not possess any assets at the time of 
filing. The temporal reference point for the verb "has" is the 
time of filing, the time at which the fee is due. 
 
Other provisions support this construction by focusing 
on the time of filing. Section 1997e(a) of T itle 42, amended 
by the PLRA, requires that the plaintif f exhaust 
administrative remedies, but only if the plaintiff is a 
prisoner at the time of filing. Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 
167 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, the applicability of the 
personal injury requirement of 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(e) turns 
on the plaintiff 's status as a prisoner , not at the time of the 
incident, but when the lawsuit is filed. Harris v. Garner, 
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216 F.3d 970, 974-975 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally, the need 
for the district court to screen a complaint in a civil action 
filed by a prisoner, as requir ed by 28 U.S.C. S 1915A, looks 
to the plaintiff 's status when the case isfiled. Johnson v. 
Hill, 965 F. Supp. 1487, 1488 n.2 (E.D. V a. 1997). 
 
V. 
 
Appellant argues that requiring pr oof of imminent danger 
as of the time of filing is inconsistent with Congress' intent. 
Having applied the American Plain Meaning Rule and 
having determined that there is no ambiguity, we are not 
required to answer this contention of the Appellant. 
Nevertheless, we perceive the congressional intent as clear 
when we examine the purpose of the entire PLRA. 
 
As noted above, Congress enacted the PLRA in or der to 
limit the filing of frivolous and vexatious prisoner lawsuits. 
To accomplish this, Congress curtailed the ability of 
prisoners to take advantage of the privilege offiling I.F.P. 
The "three strikes" rule added by the PLRA supplied a 
powerful economic incentive not to file frivolous lawsuits or 
appeals. In stark terms, it declared that the I.F.P. privilege 
will not be available to prisoners who have, on thr ee 
occasions, abused the system by filing frivolous or 
malicious lawsuits or appeals, no matter how meritorious 
subsequent claims may be. 
 
It is important to note that S 1915(g) does not block a 
prisoner's access to the federal courts. It only denies the 
prisoner the privilege of filing before he has acquired the 
necessary filing fee. Appellant argues that a prisoner 
subject to the "three strikes" rule, but who does not 
establish "imminent danger," could for ever lose his ability 
to bring his suit as a practical matter because of the 
difficulties of obtaining the money, the application of the 
statute of limitations, or the possible loss of necessary 
evidence. This argument attempts to pr ove too much. It 
overlooks the fact that prisoners may seek r elief in state 
court, where limitations on filing I.F .P. may not be as strict. 
Potentially negative consequences in federal courts, as 
distinguished from state courts, ar e precisely the 
consequences intended by Congress. The outcome predicted 
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by Appellant is, for better or for worse, exactly the result 
the PLRA intends. 
 
Recognizing that it could take prisoners a significant 
period of time to obtain the filing fee in some cases, 
Congress created a limited exception aimed at preventing 
future harms, and did so through the use of the word 
"imminent." "Imminent" dangers ar e those dangers which 
are about to occur at any moment or are impending. See 
WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITYDICTIONARY 611 (1984). 
By using the term "imminent," Congr ess indicated that it 
wanted to include a safety valve for the "thr ee strikes" rule 
to prevent impending harms, not those har ms that had 
already occurred. The imminent danger exception allows 
the district court to permit an otherwise barr ed prisoner to 
file a complaint I.F.P. if the prisoner could be subject to 
serious physical injury and does not then have the r equisite 
filing fee. 
 
In contrast, under the Gibbs construction, the prisoner 
need only show that he was subject to imminent danger at 
the time of the alleged incident. By definition, an imminent 
threat of serious physical injury always exists in the 
moments before any such injury is inflicted. Thus, under 
the Gibbs approach, any time that an otherwise disqualified 
prisoner alleges that any threat of physical injury occurred 
at any time, that prisoner automatically qualifies for the 
imminent danger exception. The Gibbs interpr etation of the 
imminent danger exception thereby swallows the rule. Like 
every other court of appeals that has consider ed this issue, 
we refuse to conclude that with one hand Congr ess 
intended to enact a statutory rule that would r educe the 
huge volume of prisoner litigation, but, with the other 
hand, it engrafted an open-ended exception that would 
eviscerate the rule.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The dissent devotes much effort to asserting that, even under our time 
of filing construction, Appellant's S 1983 Complaint satisfied the terms 
of 
the imminent danger exception because the Complaint, under the 
dissent's liberal construction, alleged an ongoing risk of serious 
physical 
injury. Importantly, at no point in the present litigation did Appellant 
seek to rely on an ongoing danger theory, even through the able counsel 
appointed by this court for purposes of this appeal. Inasmuch as the 
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This is not to suggest that we would criticize any statute 
or judicially-created legal precept that would permit any 
prisoner, even a frequent filer, to file such a complaint I.F.P. 
Such a notion is entirely compatible with the precept that 
for any injury, there should be a remedy. But we do not 
write in the abstract here, nor do we write on a clean slate. 
Congress has deliberately decided to legislate on this 
subject by proclaiming, as public policy, a determination to 
reduce prisoner litigation in the federal courts. As citizens, 
we may disagree with the congressional wisdom, but as 
judges, knowing the clearly stated legislative purpose, we 
may not disembowel the legislative act. Federal courts, 
unlike state common law King's Bench courts, do not have 
unlimited power and authority. We are limited to that which 
has been granted by Congress. What Congr ess gives it may 
also take away. The ability to proceed I.F .P. is not a 
constitutional right. Congress granted the right to proceed 
I.F.P. in 1892, and it has the power to limit this statutorily 
created right. Here it has taken away our ability as judges 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
dissent uses our silence with respect to an issue not raised by the 
parties to argue that our construction of the imminent danger exception 
eliminates a prisoner's ability to satisfy the imminent danger exception 
by alleging an ongoing risk of serious physical injury, we respond only 
by stressing that we by no means intend such a result. 
 
At all events, we doubt whether the allegations in Appellant's S 1983 
Complaint suffice to establish such an ongoing danger. Even under a 
liberal reading of Appellant's pleading, it is evident that Appellant's 
allegations center on an incident that occurr ed on or about January 9, 
1998, when a prison official allegedly sprayed Appellant with pepper gas. 
App. 9-10. Appellant does not identify any further incidents occurring 
after that date. Moreover, although Appellant alleges that he experienced 
several other acts of physical harassment by dif ferent prison officials, 
these events not only all pre-date the January 9th incident, but also 
appear entirely unconnected to it, and thus undermine the dissent's 
claim that the danger to Appellant was ongoing. Finally, while Appellant 
does allege that he complained for a year about the use of pepper gas 
(App. 10), and that prison officials engaged in"continuing harassment, 
ploits [sic] to hurt or kill [him], and other forms of retaliation," (App. 
8, 
9) such generalized allegations strike us as insufficient to connect the 
separate incidents mentioned above into a patter n of threats of serious 
physical injury that are ongoing. 
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to grant I.F.P. status to a "thr ee strikes" prisoner, no matter 
how meritorious his or her subsequent claims may be, 
unless the prisoner "is under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury" when he or she "bring[s] a civil action." 
Congress has held trump here, and it has dealt a hand. As 
judges we must play it. 
 
VI. 
 
Appellant also mounts the argument that S 1915(g), as we 
interpret it, would offend the equal pr otection guarantee 
implied in the Fifth Amendment by improperly burdening a 
prisoner's "fundamental right of access" to the courts.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In his reply brief, Appellant contends for the first time that this 
interpretation of the statute runs counter to the protections assured by 
the Eighth Amendment. Appellant argues that"[t]he right to be free from 
serious physical injury while in prison is sur ely as fundamental as the 
right to divorce," citing as authority Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 
(1971), and that, therefore, he is entitled to a waiver of filing fees as 
a 
matter of law. We will not discuss the merits of this contention because 
Abdul-Akbar waived this argument by not raising it in his opening brief. 
Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000). "[The argument in 
the reply brief comes] too late . . . . Rule 28(a)(5) of the Federal Rules 
of 
Appellate Procedure and our Local Rule 28.1(a) require appellants to set 
forth the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support 
of those issues in their opening brief." Id. ; see also Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 
1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) ("It is well settled that if an appellant 
fails 
to comply with these requirements on a particular issue, the appellant 
normally has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal and it need 
not be addressed by the court of appeals."). 
 
The dissent contends that Abdul-Akbar's waiver should be ignored 
because an assessment of the importance of a claimed constitutional 
interest is an implicit part of any equal pr otection or due process 
inquiry 
determining the level of scrutiny that will apply to a challenged 
government action. The dissent agrees with Abdul-Akbar that the right 
to be free from serious physical injury is just as weighty as the right to 
a divorce at issue in Boddie, and would hold that such a right represents 
a fundamental interest for Boddie purposes. Furthermore, the dissent 
also points to several other underlying rights, including the First 
Amendment right to free exercise of r eligion, that are not at issue in 
the 
instant case, but that the dissent would also pr esumably treat as 
fundamental interests under Boddie. What the dissent fails to recognize, 
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Moreover, he argues that we must apply strict scrutiny in 
considering this contention and that, alternatively, even 
under rational basis scrutiny, the statute, as we interpret 
it, does not pass constitutional muster because it is not 
rationally related to a legitimate gover nmental interest. 
 
A. 
 
Although the Fifth Amendment contains no Equal 
Protection Clause, "the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in 
discrimination that is `so unjustifiable as to be violative of 
due process.' " Schlesinger v. Ballar d, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 
(1975) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954)). Accordingly, the Court has construed the Fifth 
Amendment to contain an equal protection guarantee. See, 
e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 
(1991). Fifth Amendment equal protection claims are 
examined under the same principles that apply to such 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) 
(citations omitted). Statutes that substantially bur den a 
fundamental right or target a suspect class must be 
reviewed under "strict scrutiny;" that is, to survive, they 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest. Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 
(1982). Conversely, if a statute neither bur dens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause, so long as it bears a rational 
relationship to some legitimate end. Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
however, is that the importance of the underlying right is largely 
immaterial to the question whether that right is a fundamental interest 
for Boddie purposes. As we discuss infra  in Part VI.B., an underlying 
constitutional entitlement rises to the level of a Boddie fundamental 
interest only when the government blocks the sole legal means for 
safeguarding that entitlement, and not simply because the interest itself 
is a weighty one. 
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This requires us first to determine whether Appellant is 
a member of a suspect class or whether a fundamental 
right is implicated. Neither prisoners nor indigents are 
suspect classes. See, e.g., Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921, 
923 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that prisoners do not constitute 
a suspect class); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S 297, 323 (1980) 
(noting that poverty is not a suspect classification). Nor has 
Appellant argued before us that indigent prisoners, 
specifically, frequent filer indigent prisoners, are a suspect 
class. We then must inquire whether the"time of filing" 
construction infringes upon one of Appellant's fundamental 
rights. 
 
B. 
 
Appellant contends that the "time of filing" interpretation 
adopted by our sister courts of appeals and adopted by us 
today unconstitutionally burdens his fundamental right of 
access to the courts by requiring him to pay fees. But the 
right of access to the courts is not absolute. United States 
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972). Courts pr esented with 
this issue have consistently held that merely r equiring a 
prisoner to pay filing fees in a civil case does not, standing 
alone, violate that prisoner's right of meaningful access to 
the courts. See, e.g., Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 724 
(11th Cir. 1998); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 
1997). We agree. Section 1915(g) does not prevent a 
prisoner with "three strikes" fromfiling a civil action; he or 
she is simply unable to enjoy the benefits of pr oceeding 
I.F.P. and must pay the fees at the time of filing instead of 
under the installment plan. And, given the right of 
Congress to limit the power of federal courts, it cannot be 
said that limiting the temporal aspect of the exception to 
the "three strikes" rule infringes upon Appellant's right of 
access to the courts. 
 
The Court has recognized only a "narr ow category of civil 
cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial 
processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court 
fees." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996). An 
unconditional right of access exists for civil cases only 
when denial of a judicial forum would implicate a 
fundamental human interest -- such as the ter mination of 
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parental rights or the ability to obtain a divorce. Id. at 116- 
117; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-383 (1971). 
Examples of interests that the Court has held do not rise to 
this level are bankruptcy filings, Kras , 409 U.S. at 444-445, 
and welfare benefit determinations, Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 
U.S. 656, 659 (1973). 
 
In the seminal case of Boddie, the Court emphasized that 
the deprivation of due process emanated fr om "the State's 
refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole 
means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce,  [and that this] 
must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an 
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a 
dissolution of their marriages." 401 U.S. at 380-381 
(emphasis added). Unlike the parties in Boddie , Appellant is 
not precluded from filing his S 1983 Complaint in another 
court system that does not have a "three strikes" provision. 
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction overS 1983 cases. 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990). Appellant can 
seek I.F.P. status under Delawar e law because it does not 
have a parallel "three strikes" rule. See generally 10 Del. C. 
S 8802 (I.F.P. statute). A state court provides a fully 
adequate forum for the vindication of civil rights claims. 
See generally Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) 
("[S]tate courts have inherent authority, and are thus 
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising 
under the laws of the United States."). Because neither 
Delaware substantive law nor Delaware court rules 
prevented him, as an indigent prison litigant, from 
pursuing his claims, we do not agree that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate test. We therefor e examine S 1915(g) using 
rational basis review as have our sister courts of appeals. 
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 
1999); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1008 (1999); Wilson v. Yaklich, 
148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1139 (1999); Rivera, 144 F.3d at 727; Carson v. Johnson, 
112 F.3d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 
C. 
 
We are satisfied that our interpr etation of S 1915(g) 
passes the rational basis test. Appellant focuses on the 
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right of access to the courts, arguing thatS 1915(g)'s 
purpose and effect is to prevent him and other frequent filer 
prisoner indigents from filing civil lawsuits. In addressing 
this contention, we must first examine the legislative 
purpose. 
 
As discussed above, the legislation was aimed at the 
skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners -- many 
of which are emotionally driven but legally deficient -- and 
the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the 
federal courts. Congress sought to put in place economic 
incentives that would prompt prisoners to "stop and think" 
before filing a complaint.3 The "three strikes" rule thus 
serves as a rational deterrent mechanism, for cing potential 
prisoner litigants to examine whether their filings have any 
merit before they are filed, and disqualifying frequent filers 
who have failed in the past to carefully evaluate their 
claims prior to filing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Congress's rationale for placing the fee requirements on prisoners is 
captured in the statements of Senator Jon Kyl: 
 
        Section 2 will require prisoners to pay a very small share of the 
        large burden they place on the Federal judicial system by paying a 
        small filing fee upon commencement of lawsuits. In doing so, the 
        provision will deter frivolous inmate lawsuits. The modest 
monetary 
        outlay will force prisoners to think twice about the case and not 
just 
        file reflexively. Prisoners will have to make the same decision 
that 
        law-abiding Americans must make: Is the lawsuit worth the price? 
        Criminals should not be given a special privilege that other 
        Americans do not have . . . . The volume of prisoner litigation 
        represents a large burden on the judicial system, which is already 
        overburdened by increases in nonprisoner litigation. Yet prisoners 
        have very little incentive not to file nonmeritorious lawsuits. 
Unlike 
        other prospective litigants who seek poor person status, prisoners 
        have all the necessities of life supplied, including the materials 
        required to bring their lawsuits. For a prisoner who qualifies for 
        poor person status, there is no cost to bring a suit and, 
therefore, 
        no incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance of 
        success. The filing fee is small enough not to deter a prisoner 
with 
        a meritorious claim, yet large enough to deter frivolous claims 
and 
        multiple filings. 
 
141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (citation omitted). 
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Deterring frivolous prisoner filings in the federal courts 
falls within the realm of Congress' legitimate interests, and 
the interpretation we adopt today is rationally related to the 
achievement of that interest. "[T]he right of access to federal 
courts is not a free floating right, but rather is subject to 
Congress' Article III power to set limits on federal 
legislation." Roller, 107 F.3d at 231. Although it had the 
power to do so, Congress did not repeal any particular 
cause-of-action available to prisoners. Rather , Congress 
changed only the rules regarding I.F .P. status. Under 
S 1915(g), prisoners are still able tofile civil actions; they 
are merely prohibited from enjoying I.F.P. status. Lyon v. 
Krol, 127 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir . 1997); Carson, 112 F.3d 
at 821. Preventing frequent filers fr om obtaining fee waivers 
is rationally related to the legitimate gover nment interest of 
deterring frivolous lawsuits because "Congr ess is no more 
compelled to guarantee free access to federal courts than it 
is to provide unlimited access to them." Roller, 107 F.3d at 
231. Although the dissent claims that the "thr ee strikes" 
rule embodied in S 1915(g) is too blunt an instrument and 
is insufficiently targeted to arrest frivolous filings, we have 
always recognized that constitutional constraints "require[ ] 
neither a perfect nor even best availablefit" between a 
statute's goal and the means employed in that statute to 
further that goal. United States v. Mariani, 212 F.3d 761, 
774 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 
Congress included an exception to the "thr ee strikes" rule 
for those cases in which it appears that judicial action is 
needed as soon as possible to prevent serious physical 
injuries from occurring in the meantime. Thus,S 1915(g) 
rationally balances the economic deterrence rationale 
behind the "three strikes" rule with the need for those 
prisoners who remain in danger of futur e grievous harm to 
be able to file immediately. Accordingly, we hold that our 
interpretation of S 1915(g) does not violate equal protection 
concepts embodied in the Fifth Amendment. 
 
* * * * * 
 
We have considered all contentions pr esented by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
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The judgment of the district court will be affir med.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court acknowledges with appreciation the able pro bono 
representation of Appellant by the lawfirm of Jenner & Block. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges 
Sloviter, Nygaard and McKee join. 
 
I. 
 
Today the majority interprets and applies the "three 
strikes" rule of the Prison Litigation Refor m Act of 1995 
("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g), in a manner destined to bar 
the doors of our courts against a disfavored gr oup -- 
indigent prisoners who have resorted unsuccessfully to civil 
litigation -- even with respect to meritorious litigation that 
may be their sole means of vindicating a fundamental right. 
Because I believe that this case falls within a statutory 
exception, as properly interpreted in Gibbs,1 and that the 
statute, as interpreted and applied by the majority, 
substantially burdens fundamental rights without narrowly 
serving a compelling governmental inter est, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
In 1990 we struck down a District Court injunction 
barring in forma pauperis ("IFP") suits by the same 
Appellant before us today as violative of the constitutional 
right of access to the courts, and we directed instead entry 
of an injunction that would permit such suits subject to 
certification and review calculated to test for frivolity. See 
Abdul Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990). While 
not expressly repudiating our holding in Watson, the 
majority nonetheless essentially holds that what the 
District Court was then precluded from doing by the 
Constitution it is now required to do by statute. Today's 
holding therefore places us at odds with a well-established 
line of cases exemplified by Watson.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
2. In both Watson and our prior decision in In re Packer Avenue 
Associates, 884 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1989), we adopted the approach of the 
District of Columbia Circuit in the leading case of In re Green, 669 F.2d 
779 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069,1072 
n.6 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Several courts have held that a total ban 
on all IFP filings by a particular litigant as a sanction for abuse is 
impermissible.") (citing Green and cases from Second, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits); Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three 
Strikes and You're Out of Court -- It May Be Effective, But Is It 
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This case unfortunately illustrates the maxim that bad 
cases may sometimes make bad law. This Appellant has 
clearly abused the IFP system, filing some 200 cases, most 
without merit. The three strikes rule as interpreted by the 
majority, however, will burden other  would-be litigants who 
have not filed 200 cases, and whose "strikes" were racked 
up without any bad faith or abuse.3 It will, moreover, bar 
potentially meritorious litigation at the filing stage, with no 
opportunity for substantive review or appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The principal holding announced by the majority is not 
very far-reaching. It rejects a statement in our earlier Gibbs 
case to the effect that imminent danger is to be determined 
as of the time of the incident complained of, and joins with 
our sister courts of appeals that have held that danger 
must exist at the time the Complaint or appeal isfiled. I 
joined in, and continue to adhere to, the able opinion of 
Judge Garth in Gibbs. In Gibbs we held that a prisoner who 
alleged two prior attacks by inmates and death thr eats, 
each related to his identification as a gover nment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constitutional?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, n. 90-91 (Summer 1997) 
(providing extensive citations to circuit court cases requiring that 
injunctions be narrowly tailored to pr eserve access for legitimate 
claims). 
The sole difference between the pr eclusive effect of injunctions held 
impermissible in the cited cases and the statutory bar of section 1915(g) 
is that the latter includes a narrow exception (extremely narrow, as 
interpreted by the majority) which is patently insufficient to safeguard 
the broad scope of rights jeopardized by the IFP ban. Cf. Procup, 792 
F.2d at 1074 (Clark, J., concurring) (construing limitation of IFP for 
abusive prisoner litigant to "claims alleging actual or threatened 
physical 
harm" to be "an unconstitutional denial of access"). 
 
3. Although dismissals for failure to state a claim do not necessarily 
signify abuse, they nonetheless count as "strikes" for purposes of 
section 1915(g). Moreover, the many procedural and substantive hurdles 
erected in the path of civil rights claims against government actors might 
easily trip up a pro se litigant with a bona fide claim. The majority's 
repeated characterization of the statutory bar as applying only to 
prisoners who "abuse" the judicial system byfiling frivolous actions is 
therefore somewhat misleading. 
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informant, and who alleged that his "life[was] in constant 
danger", provided sufficient allegations of "imminent 
danger" to survive the "three strikes" rule. Although our 
principal holding was that "a complaint alleging imminent 
danger . . . must be credited as having satisfied the 
threshold criterion of S 1915(g) unless[that] element is 
challenged", we also stated that "the pr oper focus when 
examining an inmate's complaint filed pursuant to 
S 1915(g) must be the imminent danger faced by the inmate 
at the time of the alleged incident, and not at the time the 
complaint was filed." 116 F.3d at 86. 
 
No clear intent may be discerned from section 1915(g)'s 
use of the present tense ("unless the prisoner is under 
imminent danger"), because the same subsection elsewhere 
employs the present tense in refer ence to what are 
expressly recognized as past events ("if the prisoner has 
brought an action or appeal . . . that was  dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a 
claim . . ."). This erroneous combination of tenses renders 
the statutory provision ambiguous, and I believe that such 
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of pr eserving the right 
of access to the courts for prisoners threatened with bodily 
injury. 
 
As the majority has acknowledged, the purpose of the 
exception is to "prevent[ ] futur e harms." Supra at 11. This 
purpose is best served by a liberal interpretation of the 
exception, one which gives scope to -- and so facilitates -- 
the deterrent effect of the subsequent damages remedy 
available under section 1983. See City of Riverside v. 
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (plurality) (stating that 
"the damages a plaintiff recovers contribute significantly to 
the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future"). Cf. 
Gibbs (rejecting argument that "suit for damages rather 
than injunctive relief . . . was not seeking to protect . . . 
physical safety"). 116 F.3d at 85. Contrary to the majority's 
assertion, the exception as interpreted by Gibbs does not 
"eviscerate" the three strikes rule. A would-be litigant must 
plead imminent danger of serious physical injury (rather 
than a deprivation of procedural, associational, religious or 
other rights), and the court must determine that such 
danger is or was in fact present if such allegation is 
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controverted. Moreover, as discussed below, section 
1915(g)'s potential encroachment into important 
 665<!>constitutional rights also counsels for a br oad 
 
interpretation of the exception. Finally, the importance of 
presenting an appropriately lenient interpretation in this en 
banc opinion -- which will guide the district courts in their 
decisions on hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoner filings 
-- is heightened by the preclusive natur e of section 1915(g). 
That is, the denial of in forma pauperis  status and resultant 
dismissal of prisoner litigation made pursuant ther eto will 
be effectively unreviewable, as a truly indigent plaintiff will 
no more be able to afford the r equisite filing costs for 
appeal of that dismissal than for the underlying action. 
 
III. 
 
While I disagree with the majority's rejection of the 
standard enunciated in Gibbs for one which determines the 
existence of imminent danger at the time the Complaint or 
appeal is filed, it is the majority's application of that 
standard to the facts of this case, and implicitly to those of 
Gibbs, that I find considerably more tr oubling. 
 
The majority appears simply to assume that its holding 
that imminent danger must be assessed at the time offiling 
is dispositive of this case, and that Appellant was not in 
such danger. In so assuming, the majority seriously 
undermines protection of physically endangered prisoners 
by paying too little heed to ongoing threats. 
 
The majority's lengthy explication of statutory tense 
notwithstanding, an equally crucial question of 
interpretation under section 1915(g) concer ns the meaning 
of "imminent danger". The majority's definition of 
"imminent" dangers as those "which ar e about to occur at 
any moment or impending", supra at 11, is far too 
restrictive. In a real-world prison setting, the timing of an 
attack cannot be so neatly predicted. It may be that an 
ongoing threat of danger looms over a prisoner for an 
extended period. At any given moment, the har m might not 
be "about to" occur; then again, it might. Such is the 
nature of "danger". It involves risk, not certainty. 
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The phrase "imminent danger" is not defined in the 
PLRA. It may be instructive, however, to consider the 
definition accorded the same phrase in other contexts. For 
example, under the Eighth Amendment prison authorities 
must protect prisoners not only from curr ent threats, but 
also from "sufficiently imminent dangers"; the courts have 
defined that phrase as encompassing those dangers"likely 
to cause harm in the `next week, month, or year.' " Horton 
v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Payne v. Collins, 
986 F. Supp. 1036, 1052 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (observing that 
this approach includes review of the actions taken to 
alleviate the threat).4 In discussing "imminent harm" in the 
preliminary injunction context, we have held that standard 
met where the potential harm was not"uncertain or 
speculative", but might be expected to occur before the 
threat could otherwise be averted.5  In determining 
standing, the courts have framed their inquiry into the 
"immediate threat" as one encompassing consideration of 
the likelihood of an ongoing danger, as evidenced by past 
events. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 488, 496 
(1974) ("past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there 
is a real and immediate threat of r epeated injury"). 
 
Indeed, this conception of imminent danger as 
encompassing an ongoing threat has been explicitly 
recognized by one of our sister circuits. In Ashley v. 
Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See also, e.g., Maze v. Hargett, 1998 WL 378369 *3 (Apr. 27, 1998 
N.D. Miss.) (finding "sufficiently imminent danger of future physical 
harm" during prisoner's "tenure" in light of continuing conditions). 
 
5. BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 
263 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Charles Alan W right, Arthur R. Miller, Mary 
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedur e S 2948.1 at 139 (2d ed. 1995) 
as "explaining that imminence requires that the harm will occur before 
a trial on the merits can be had"). Another statute similarly "defines the 
threat of `imminent danger' as the existence of a condition . . . which 
could `[r]easonably be expected to cause substantial harm . . . before 
such condition . . . can be abated.' " Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 301 (1981), quoting the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.S 1291(8) (1976 ed., 
Supp. III). 
 
                                24 
  
held that a prisoner placed in continuing pr oximity to 
inmates on his "enemy alert list" and subject to prior 
assaults "properly alleged an ongoing danger" and so "[met] 
the imminent danger exception of section 1915(g)." 147 
F.3d at 717.6 
 
Appellant's litigious history may incline us to r ead his 
Complaint with a certain degree of skepticism. Nonetheless, 
our precedents require us to construe pleadings, and 
especially pro se pleadings, liberally. See Gibbs, 116 F.3d at 
86 (observing that "[u]nder our liberal pleading rules" all 
allegations should be construed "in favor of the 
complainant") (citations omitted). Reading the Complaint in 
the light most favorable to Appellant, I find his claimed 
predicament alarming. 
 
Appellant, a black inmate, brought this action seeking, 
inter alia, an injunction against white prison guar ds "from 
continuing . . . plots to hurt or kill [him]". App. 8. The 
guards in question are asserted to be racists who "don't 
accept . . . Black people as human beings" and thus do not 
respect rights of any black person. App. 13. Appellant is a 
particular target of the guards' animus, as he asserts they 
are engaged in a conspiracy to retaliate against Appellant 
for filing complaints against them for past abuses. App. 9. 
 
Guards have made a practice of using pepper gas 
routinely to punish inmates for failing to obey orders or for 
"saying something an officer don't like." App. 10. "[M]ajor 
problems happen on the white [guards'] shifts, especially 
Black inmate's [sic] getting sprayed arbitrarily with pepper 
gas." App. 13. Although Appellant complained for over a 
year about the abuse of pepper gas, no restraint was placed 
on the use of pepper gas. App. 10, 11. 
 
Defendants "know [Appellant has] asthma . .. and 
they've seen [him] suffer whenever that pepper gas has 
been sprayed." App. 12. The danger faced by Appellant was 
not limited to attacks directed against him. Rather, the use 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See also Choyce v. Dominguez, 160 F .3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(remanding for reconsideration of imminent danger determination where 
prisoner alleged incident complained of "was only one episode in an 
ongoing pattern of threats and violence" in retaliation for prior 
litigation). 
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of pepper gas "effects [sic] every inmate . . . in the area". 
For example, in December, 1997, Appellant was exposed to 
pepper gas directed at other inmates and was taken to the 
hospital with an asthma attack. App. 10-11. 
 
In September or October of 1997, in a "deliberate attempt 
to have [Appellant] hurt or killed", a guar d told an inmate 
that Appellant had "snitched" on him and other inmates. 
App. 12. Although Appellant feared for his life as a result of 
this incident, his request for protective custody was not 
honored. App. 12. 
 
On January 8, 1998 Appellant was transferred to a cell 
block with no window "for the express purpose's [sic] of 
having [him] in an area where the[racist guards] could 
harass, set up and try to kill [him]". The very next day, one 
of the defendant guards, again in the pr esence of other 
inmates, accused Appellant of informing, and proceeded to 
spray him with an entire can of pepper gas, whereupon 
Appellant collapsed with an asthma attack, "fighting for 
breath on the floor" and the guard"left [him] on the floor to 
die." 
 
As far as the record reflects, none of the foregoing 
conditions had been corrected at the time Appellant filed 
his Complaint.7 
 
In sum, Appellant alleges that at the time of the 
Complaint (i) Appellant remained confined in an institution 
controlled by guards who believed he did not have any 
rights and who had a vendetta against him; (ii) the guards 
made a practice of spraying inmates with pepper gas (to 
which Appellant was acutely vulnerable) on slight 
provocation, and prison officials placed no r estraint on that 
practice; (iii) Appellant had been injured twice by pepper 
gas within just the past 10 weeks prior to filing; 8 (iv) the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although many of the foregoing allegations may strike the reader as 
improbable, they are as yet uncontr overted, and I believe that we are 
required to accept them as true for pr esent purposes. Cf. Gibbs, 116 
F.3d at 86 (holding that a district court should accept the allegations in 
the Complaint in determining imminent danger for IFP purposes, 
pending the appearance of a defendant who may contr overt the 
allegations). 
 
8. Cf. Ashley, 147 F.3d at 717 (concluding imminent danger exception 
met in part because "complaint was filed very shortly [within one month] 
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guards had incited hostility toward Appellant on the part of 
other prisoners by labeling Appellant as an infor mant;9 and 
(v) Appellant was housed in a cell block selected to facilitate 
attacks by guards and inmates. These unabated conditions 
clearly give rise to an ongoing imminent danger . 
 
Hence, I believe the facts alleged in this case place 
Appellant squarely within a proper interpr etation of the 
exception to the three strikes rule. In Gibbs, as in Ashley 
and Choyce, there were similarly sufficient averments of 
ongoing danger that remained "imminent" at the time of 
filing.10 The majority today disposes of this case, overrules 
Gibbs, and effectively disagrees with Ashley and Choyce, 
without carefully analyzing the sufficiency of the allegations 
of ongoing danger.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
after the last attack"); Choyce, 160 F .3d at 1071 n. 4 (suggesting 
reconsideration in light of erroneous view that 17 months had passed 
since last injury, where actually complaint wasfiled in 40 days). 
 
9. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974) ("Relationships 
among the inmates are . . . perhaps subject to the unwritten code that 
exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner. . . . . The reality is 
that disciplinary hearings . . . necessarily involve confrontations . . . 
between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge 
or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a 
theoretical possibility . . . ."). 
 
10. See Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (inmates' awareness 
of prisoner's status as informer subjected him to threats and attacks; 
Gibbs claimed his "life [was] in constant danger" and conditions were 
unaddressed until litigation filed; prisoner was transferred during 
pendency of appeal); see also supra n. 6 and accompanying text 
(discussing Ashley and Choyce). 
 
11. The majority neglects duly to consider the actual averments of 
Appellant's complaint, instead observing that "at no point in the present 
litigation did Appellant seek to rely on an ongoing danger theory". Supra 
at 11 n.1. To the contrary, Appellant's counsel stated at oral argument 
that "if you look to the complaint itself, . . . he alleges a continuing 
course of conduct." Moreover, Appellant's counsel expressly "embrace[d]" 
the argument that the time at which imminent danger is assessed is not 
controlling, because "imminent really doesn't mean impending." 
 
In any event, the majority opines as to the sufficiency of allegations of 
ongoing harm, and in doing so applies too exacting a standard. Turning 
 
                                27 
  
The result is that, henceforth in this Cir cuit, prisoners 
with three strikes seeking IFP status will be faced with an 
insurmountable obstacle: they must show that a serious 
physical injury is "about to" befall them"at any moment", 
and apparently they may not predicate their showing on an 
ongoing risk based on past events.12 What, then, will 
suffice? Must a prisoner be running from his attackers as 
he files? By limiting the imminent danger exception to the 
"sword of Damocles" situation, the majority all but writes 
the exception out of the statute. Certainly, the drastically 
impoverished version of the exception allowed by the 
majority cannot well fulfill its putative office as "a safety 
valve . . . to prevent impending harms". Supra at 1113 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
briefly to the complaint, the majority expr esses "doubt whether [it] 
suffice[s] to establish such an ongoing danger." Supra at 12 n.1. Of 
course, under our liberal pleading rules such a doubt should be resolved 
for, rather than against, Appellant. Similarly, the majority's observation 
that some of Appellant's allegations are "generalized" should not control 
our reading of the complaint. Even if those general allegations were not 
supported with specific facts, as they are here, a pleading should be 
deemed sufficient if it provides reasonable notice of the theories 
presented. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). This lenity in 
pleading review is especially important as applied to an indigent, 
incarcerated, pro se litigant whose access to the courts is narrowly 
circumscribed. 
 
The majority concludes that Appellant's allegations fall short because 
the several acts of which he complains are"unconnected", and do not 
form a "pattern". Supra at 12 n.1. A fair reading of the complaint 
indicates, however, that the events ar e connected by two alleged ongoing 
factors: a long-established practice of arbitrary use of pepper gas 
against 
black inmates, and a specific animus on the part of the guards against 
Appellant. Moreover, in suggesting that the mere passage of time 
between the incidents and after the last incident means that the danger 
was no longer imminent at the time of filing, the majority disregards the 
continuing, unremedied nature of the factors that allegedly caused the 
incidents. Indeed, the occurrence of multiple incidents over a substantial 
time period supports rather than under mines the conclusion that 
Appellant's danger was ongoing. 
12. Cf. O'Shea, supra. 
 
13. The majority's narrow reading of the exception will have a far- 
reaching effect, as persistent, ongoing imminent danger is a condition all 
too often encountered in our nation's prisons. Cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562 
(In many prisons, "[g]uards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate 
contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment 
and despair are commonplace."). 
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A prisoner's resort to the courts may be expected to avert 
impending danger not only by correcting unlawful 
conditions,14 but by deterring prison officials from unlawful 
conduct. Under the majority's interpretation, the potential 
deterrence of civil rights damages would be lost with 
respect to indigent prisoners with a history of prior failed 
suits. That is, guards would be free to abuse or retaliate 
against such prisoners without fear of civil liability, so long 
as their conduct was not so perpetual as to trigger the 
majority's test for imminent danger. 
 
The majority's undermining of the protections afforded 
civil rights under section 1983 is exacerbated by other 
factors which, by delaying access to courts, incr ease the 
likelihood that past abuses will effectively be immunized 
because a danger will no longer be "imminent" at the time 
of filing.15 
 
Finally, even in the rare case that satisfies the majority's 
narrow definition of imminent danger at the time of filing, 
a prisoner is effectively denied protection against trial error. 
Under the majority's interpretation, a prisoner who has 
secured a final judgment in the District Court finds himself 
in a peculiar position: he must once again meet the 
"imminent danger" requirement at that moment in time in 
order to file an appeal IFP. It is highly improbable that the 
danger would still be "about to" occur at the time of an 
appeal, following entry of judgment. 
 
Although the majority opinion purports to cr eate 
unanimity among the courts of appeals, it does not and 
cannot achieve that purpose. As discussed above, today's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Such correction may occur through formal intervention of the courts 
or through voluntary redress in r esponse to a prisoner's invocation of 
the 
judicial process. Cf. Medberry v. Butler , 185 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(prisoner subject to physical assaults transferr ed shortly after 
complaint 
was filed). 
 
15. For example, prisoners who have been thr eatened or attacked are 
often subject to administrative solitary confinement or hospitalization, 
respectively. Moreover, our recent decisions in Booth v. Churner, 206 
F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2000) and Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d 
Cir. 2000) require the exhaustion of internal prison remedies as a 
prerequisite for filing an action underS 1983 or Bivens. 
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holding cannot be reconciled with either the Eighth 
Circuit's decision in Ashley or the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
Choyce. Those cases evaluated the danger as of the filing 
date, but both recognized that the imminent danger 
requirement may be satisfied by an ongoing threat 
evidenced by past injuries attributable to uncorr ected 
conditions. See supra n. 6 and accompanying text.16 We 
cannot avoid a conflict by reciting similar standards, while 
reaching inconsistent results. 
 
I would hold that the exception applies, in accor d with 
Gibbs, Ashley and Choyce; and I would leave for another 
day determination of the constitutional validity of section 
1915(g) in a case that clearly falls outside of its saving 
exception.17 However, since the majority has interpreted the 
exception narrowly and has found this case within the rule 
barring IFP status, I will proceed to addr ess the statute's 
constitutionality. 
 
IV. 
 
As the majority acknowledges, "[s]tatutes that 
substantially burden a fundamental right . . . must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982)." Supra 
at 14.18 The right of access to the courts has long been 
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16. It should be noted that Choyce took a noticeably different approach 
from Banos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 1998), the earlier Fifth 
Circuit case relied upon by the majority. 
 
17. "It is a well established rule that needless constitutional 
adjudication 
is to be avoided, and, toward that end, that when `a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be 
avoided,' such construction should be given" Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829 
(3d Cir. 1980) (Hunter, J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(additional citations omitted). 
 
18. The same level of scrutiny also applies to laws that impose burdens 
based on a "suspect" classification. The majority reasons that neither 
prisoners nor indigents are suspect classes. It does not necessarily 
follow 
that the intersection of these classes -- the class of indigent prisoners 
-- 
is not suspect. After all, possessing neither means nor liberty (and 
having incurred the disapprobation of society), indigent prisoners are a 
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deemed fundamental. As long ago as 1215, this right was 
articulated in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta.19 In the 
seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
163 (1803) the Supreme Court observed that"[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury." Mor e recently, the Court 
has repeatedly recognized the fundamental importance of 
the right of access to courts.20 
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discrete, insular minority that is perhaps the group least able to protect 
its fundamental rights through majoritarian pr ocesses. Cf. United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more sear ching judicial inquiry") 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
19. Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta provided:"To none will we sell, to 
none will we deny or delay, right or justice." Magna Carta, c. 29 [c. 40 
of King John's Charter of 1215; c. 29 of King Edwar d's Charter of 1297] 
(1225), quoted in Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219 (3d Cir. 
1987). The effect of this guaranty was explained by Sir Edward Coke as 
follows: 
 
        [E]very subject . . . for injury done to him .. . , by any other 
subject, 
        be he . . . free, or bond, . . . or be he outlawed, . . . or any 
other 
        without exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, 
        and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely 
without 
        sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay. 
 
Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 55 
(Brooke, 5th ed. 1797), quoted in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 
(1967). 
 
20. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that 
state 
courts may not deny appellate review to criminal defendants due to their 
inability to pay transcript fees); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) 
(requiring states to waive filing fees for indigent prisoners in criminal 
cases); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (extending Griffin 
to civil divorce context, reasoning that"a cost requirement, valid on its 
face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular 
party's opportunity to be heard."); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485- 
86 (1969), (striking down ban on prisoners assisting other inmates with 
habeas corpus petitions, explaining that "it is fundamental that access of 
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In Wolff, supra, the Supreme Court held that prisoners 
have a constitutional right to bring civil rights actions 
before the courts. "The right of access to the courts . . . is 
founded in the Due Process Clause and assur es that no 
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the 
judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights." Wolff , 418 U.S. at 579.21 
 
By 1977, the Supreme Court found it to be "beyond 
doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to 
the courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).22 
The Court in Bounds described this right of access as 
"fundamental", and held that it requir es that prisoners 
receive "a reasonably adequate opportunity to present 
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to 
the courts." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, 828. Finally, in 
Lewis, the Court indicated that inmates' right of court 
access recognized in Bounds applies to actions "to challenge 
the conditions of their confinement". Lewis , 518 U.S. at 
355. 
 
As we have previously held, this right of court access 
applies even to litigious prisoners such as Appellant. See In 
re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982), quoted in 
Walton, 901 F.3d at 332 ("Access to the courts is a 
fundamental tenet to our judicial system; legitimate claims 
should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how 
litigious the plaintiff may be."). 
 
In view of this long and virtually unbroken array of 
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prisoners to the Courts for the purpose of pr esenting their complaints 
may not be denied or obstructed", and observing that "a State may not 
validly make the writ available only to prisoners who could pay a $4 
filing fee."); Wolff,supra (applying holding and rationale ofAvery to 
civil 
rights actions). 
 
21. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (stating that Wolff 
"extended the right of access to the courts" to " `civil rights actions' -
- 
i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 to vindicate `basic constitutional 
rights.' "). 
 
22. Cf. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350 (describing the "right of access to the 
courts" as "already well-established" when Bounds was decided). 
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authority,23 it can scarcely be disputed that prisoners' right 
of access to the courts is a fundamental right. The majority 
is doubtless correct in pointing out that the right of access 
is "not absolute"; no rights are. What is important for equal 
protection purposes is that the right of access is 
fundamental, at least when underlying fundamental rights 
are involved. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 
(1992) ("[T]he right to file a court action might be said to be 
[a prisoner's] remaining `most fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights.' ") (quoting Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).24  Even if access to 
courts were not itself a fundamental right, denial of access 
should still be subject to strict scrutiny to the extent that 
it may impermissibly burden underlying fundamental rights 
at stake.25 
 
Indeed, the majority opinion acknowledges that "[a]n 
unconditional right of access exists for civil cases. . . when 
denial of a judicial forum would implicate a fundamental 
human interest". Supra at 15. However, it declines to 
address whether Appellant's claims involve fundamental 
rights.26 
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23. Only twice in our history has the Supr eme Court approved exaction 
of fees which had the effect of excluding an indigent would-be party from 
court. Both cases involved gratuitous government benefits, rather than 
underlying constitutional rights. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 
(1972) (bankruptcy); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (welfare). 
 
24. See also Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[A]n 
inmate's right to . . . access to the courts is as fundamental a right as 
any other he may hold . . . . All other rights ar e illusory without 
it."); 
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 405 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Without the ability 
to access the courts and draw their attention to constitutionally 
improper behavior, . . . prisoners . . . would be deprived of the first -- 
and often the only -- `line of defense' against constitutional 
violations."). 
 
25. See Joshua D. Franklin, Thr ee Strikes and You're Out of 
Constitutional Rights? The Prison Litigation Refor m Act's "Three Strikes" 
Provision and its Effect on Indigents , 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 191, 194 
("When 
an indigent prisoner with three strikes seeks to litigate a matter 
affecting 
a fundamental interest, any legislation that substantially burdens the 
right of access to the courts must be subject to strict scrutiny review, 
rather than the more deferential rational relation standard of review."). 
 
26. The majority asserts that Appellant waived his argument that the 
right to be free from serious physical injury is as fundamental as the 
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Notwithstanding the majority's avoidance of the issue, it 
is manifest that the rights underlying Appellant's suit are 
fundamental. As I read the Complaint, at stake are the 
rights to be free from arbitrary infliction of serious physical 
injury,27 and from racially discriminatory assault.28 That 
these rights are fundamental to our constitutional system 
cannot be gainsaid.29 
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right to divorce (as to which a right of access to court was recognized in 
Boddie); but surely an assessment of the importance of the infringed 
interest is implicitly part of every due pr ocess or equal protection 
challenge. In any event, so long as we are addr essing the level of 
scrutiny to apply, we cannot avoid deciding whether a fundamental right 
is burdened. 
 
The majority responds that "the importance of the underlying right is 
largely immaterial to the question whether that right is a fundamental 
interest for Boddie purposes", because "an underlying constitutional 
entitlement rises to the level of a Boddie fundamental interest only when 
the government blocks the sole legal means for safeguarding that 
entitlement . . . ." Supra at 13 n.2. I believe this response conflates 
the 
elements of fundamental right and burden: the importance of the right 
at stake is precisely what determines whether it is "fundamental"; while 
the availability of other means to safeguard the right may help to 
determine the extent to which the right is bur dened, it has no bearing 
on whether the burdened right is fundamental. 
 
27. This right is embodied in the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments. 
 
28. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 ("Prisoners are protected under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious 
discrimination based on race."). 
 
29. Although the majority marshalls to its support cases from five other 
circuits which have applied a rational basis r eview to section 1915(g), 
four of these cases were explicitly premised on the absence of an 
underlying fundamental interest. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 
821 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding prisoner had no fundamental interest in 
subject of suit); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F .3d 719, 724 (11th Cir. 1998) 
("Rivera's well-pled allegations . . . plainly advance no cognizable 
fundamental interest."); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (agreeing with Carson and Rivera that "where a fundamental 
interest is not at stake, section 1915(g) does not infringe upon an 
inmate's meaningful access to the courts"); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 
1226, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing right of action extends to 
suits seeking to vindicate basic constitutional rights, but concluding 
that 
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Moreover, other fundamental rights ar e sure to be 
implicated in cases barred by the three strikes rule. For 
example, a suit charging denial of a prisoner's religious 
freedom in violation of the First Amendment is not likely to 
involve an element of imminent danger, and so will fall 
outside of the exception under section 1915(g). See, e.g., 
Lyon v. Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D. Iowa 1996), 
appeal dismissed, 127 F.3d 763 (8th Cir . 1997) (dismissing 
prisoner's free exercise of religion claim pursuant to three 
strikes rule). Cf. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 
348 (1987) (recognizing prisoner's fundamental right to free 
exercise of religion).30 
 
It seems clear that section 1915(g) substantially burdens 
affected prisoners' access to the courts and thereby 
burdens their enjoyment of whatever underlying rights they 
may seek to enforce in court. The statute's ef fect, in 
contravention of our law going back to the Magna Carta, is 
either to sell, to delay or to deny justice to the prisoners 
subject to its strictures.31 If they cannot buy entry into 
court, they must wait until they can; and if the wait is too 
long, justice will be denied to them.32  
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prisoner failed to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
The fifth case, Wilson v. Yaklich , 148 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1998), 
acknowledged that the constitutional right of access to the courts "is 
indeed `fundamental' " and that a prisoner's access must be "adequate, 
effective and meaningful", but found that the right was not infringed 
solely because the prisoner still had recourse to state court.  Id. at 605 
(citations omitted). 
 
30. See also Stacey H. O'Bryan, Note, Closing the Courthouse Door: The 
Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement 
on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 V a. L. Rev. 1189, 1202-10 
(1997) (mentioning the right to be free fr om racial segregation, the 
right 
to privacy, and the right to be free fr om non-physical violations of the 
Eighth Amendment as among those left unprotected as to prisoners 
barred from litigation by section 1915(g)). 
 
31. Cf. n.19, supra (discussing Magna Carta's prohibition against sale, 
delay or denial of justice). 
 
32. According to the majority, Congress "[r]ecogniz[ed] that it could take 
prisoners a significant period of time to obtain the filing fee in some 
cases". Supra at 11. 
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In response to the apparent burden on fundamental 
rights, the majority makes two arguments: First, the 
majority argues that section 1915(g) does not prevent 
affected prisoners from filing their actions, but only from 
enjoying IFP status. The same argument was pr eviously 
made by the Eleventh Circuit. See Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 
719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998). This argument reflects a 
surprising disregard for the practicalfinancial constraints 
faced by indigent prisoners, and appears to ignor e the 
reality, recognized by the Supreme Court, that even a small 
prepayment obligation can pose an insur mountable hurdle. 
See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380 (acknowledging that a facially 
valid fee may "offend due process because it operates to 
foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard."); 
Green, 669 F.2d at 786 (describing a prepayment 
requirement as a "potentially pr ohibitive financial barrier" 
to court access on the part of the affected indigent 
prisoner). The majority does not, however, r eally miss this 
point: in the very same paragraph in which it ar gues that 
section 1915(g) does not block access to the federal courts, 
it concludes that precluding suit in federal court as a 
practical matter is precisely what Congr ess intended. See 
supra at 10-11.33 
 
Because it ultimately recognizes the practical reality that 
access to the federal courts will be delayed or denied for 
some, the majority repairs to its second ar gument: that 
foreclosing the federal forum imposes no r eal burden, as 
prisoners may bring the same civil rights claims in state 
courts, "where limitations on filing I.F .P. may not be as 
strict." Supra at 10 (emphasis added); see also supra at 15. 
In the end, the majority's rejection of strict scrutiny is 
expressly predicated on the presumed availability of a state 
law forum.34 See supra at 16 ("Because neither Delaware 
substantive law nor Delaware court rules pr evented 
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33. See also Banos, 144 F.3d at 885 n. 1 ("It is possible that a potential 
litigant who is denied IFP status under this pr ovision will not have the 
ability to pay the entire filing fee within the statute of limitations or, 
in 
the case of an appeal, within the time for filing an appeal, and will 
thereby be precluded from litigating or appealing his case on the 
merits."). 
34. As the majority correctly observes, the Court's ruling in Boddie 
turned on the State's monopoly over divor ce actions and the resultant 
absence of any "recognized, effective alternatives" for resolution. 
Boddie, 
401 U.S. at 375-76. The case does not, however , stand for the 
proposition that availability of a state  forum justifies selective denial 
of 
access to a federal forum for the vindication of federal civil rights 
claims. 
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[Appellant] . . . from pursuing his claims, we do not agree 
that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test.") (emphasis 
added).35 See also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 605 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that prisoner's fundamental right of 
access to the courts was not infringed upon because he 
"still had available . . . the opportunity to litigate his federal 
constitutional causes of action in forma pauperis in state 
court."). But cf. Rivera, 144 F.3d at 724 n.9 (declining to 
place reliance on availability of state forum). 
 
Even assuming that a state forum is available, however, 
it is by no means clear that denial of a federal  forum does 
not in itself impose a substantial burden on the right of 
access. See, e.g., Lyon, 940 F .Supp. at 1437-38 ("Although 
inmates can also bring S 1983 claims in state court, 
plaintiffs have an important interest in access to federal 
courts for vindication of their federal constitutional 
rights."); see also Procup, 792 F .2d at 1070 ("An absolute 
bar against a prisoner filing any suit in federal court would 
be patently unconstitutional."); Green , 669 F.2d at 786 
(concluding that "constitutional right of access to the 
courts" was "unduly impair[ed]" by or der that effectively 
denied "any and all access to the district court"); Packer 
Avenue Assocs., 884 F.2d at 748 (holding that order 
prohibiting subsequent filings in federal court could "not be 
allowed to stand").36 
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35. If, as appears to be the case, the statute's constitutionality as 
applied 
to suits based on fundamental rights hinges on the availability of an 
adequate state forum, we should make this limitation explicit in order to 
guide the District Courts. 
 
36. The argument that federal courts may turn a deaf ear to those who 
have access to state courts "disregar ds the historic importance of access 
to federal courts to pursue civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983." 
Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act , 70 Temp. L. Rev. at 512. Cf. 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (one purpose of S 1983 "was 
to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in 
theory, was not available in practice"); McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 153 
("federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims 
of prison inmates") (citations omitted). 
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected 
the converse argument that the availability of a federal remedy justified 
a filing fee that effectively barred indigent prisoners from state court. 
See 
 
                                37 
  
Although the alternative forum argument may have 
superficial appeal, I do not believe it can withstand 
searching examination. In the first place, the argument 
neglects to consider foreclosure of the courts to the "three- 
strikes" prisoner in states which have adopted parallel 
legislation.37 This is not mer ely an academic concern. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeared as an amicus 
curiae in this case and explained that the "many thousands 
of prisoners" housed in Pennsylvania's thirty-nine 
correctional facilities "annually file hundreds of federal civil 
actions directed against state officials and employees", and 
implied that a substantial number of those actions would 
be affected by the decision announced her ein. Because 
Pennsylvania has adopted a three strikes limitation of IFP 
status that parallels section 1915(g), ther e is no judicial 
forum available to indigent Pennsylvania prisoners with 
three strikes unless they can satisfy the majority's virtually 
preclusive test for imminent danger, no matter how 
meritorious their claims and no matter how fundamental 
the rights at stake.38 
 
In the second place, the alternative forum ar gument also 
neglects the potential implications of removal to federal 
court. Federal-law civil rights actions filed in state court 
generally may be removed by the defendants, with the likely 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). T o paraphrase the Court's 
admonition, "it would ill-behoove this gr eat [nation], whose devotion to 
the equality of rights is indelibly stamped upon its history, to say to 
its 
indigent prisoners seeking to redress what they believe to be [violations 
of federal law]: `go to the [state] court.' " Id. at 713. 
 
37. See, e.g., 41 Pa. C.S.A. S 6602(f) (West Supp. 1999); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. S 1187 (West Supp. 1999). See also Laurie Smith Camp, Why 
Nebraska Needs Prison Litigation Reform, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 781, 781 
(1997) (proposing parallel state legislation in Nebraska); Three Strikes, 
71 
U. Colo. L. Rev. at 209-210 (predicting that"[o]ther states are likely to 
respond similarly to the influx of claims br ought by [prisoners] who are 
otherwise precluded from bringing suit in forma pauperis"). 
 
38. In its amicus brief, Pennsylvania ar gues that a state forum is 
available, but inexplicably neglects to notify us that the purported 
alternative is generally unavailable to Pennsylvania prisoners with claims 
concerning prison conditions. 
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effect that an indigent plaintiff subject to the three strikes 
rule would lose his ability to appeal.39  The prospective loss 
of such an important procedural safeguar d is a very 
substantial burden on affected litigants. 40 
 
Because section 1915(g) does impose a substantial 
burden on the fundamental rights of many if not all 
members of the class against whom it is directed, the next 
step is to examine whether it is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling governmental interest. 
 
As identified by the majority, the congressional purpose 
behind section 1915(g) was to deter frivolous lawsuits 
through "economic incentives that would pr ompt prisoners 
to `stop and think' before filing a complaint." Supra at 17. 
See also supra at 10 ("The `three strikes' rule . . . supplied 
a powerful economic incentive not to file frivolous lawsuits 
or appeals.").41 It is not at all apparent how "disqualifying 
frequent filers who have failed in the past to carefully 
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39. See The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 70 Temp. L. Rev. at 513-517 
(observing that if defendant removes the case to federal court as 
permitted under 28 U.S.C. S 1441, plaintiff may lose his right to appeal 
the federal claims if he is within the provisions of section 1915(g) and 
cannot afford prepayment in full; he may also be unable to appeal 
pendent state claims over which the district court exercised 
jurisdiction). 
 
40. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 ("It is true that a State is not required 
by 
the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to 
appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a State that does 
grant 
appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some 
convicted defendants on account of their poverty."); See also Three 
Strikes, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 209 (noting that"[a]lthough the right to 
an appeal is not constitutionally guaranteed, equal protection concerns 
nevertheless arise when this right is effectively denied to only one class 
of litigant") (citing Douglas v. Califor nia, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 
(1963)). 
 
41. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, The Supr eme Court and Litigation Access 
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part II, 1974 Duke L.J. 527, 559 
(observing that a fixed fee's deterrent ef fect on frivolous filings will 
vary 
inversely with the individual's finances, with the truly indigent being 
"totally `deterred' "). Michelman concludes that " `Deterrence' in any 
acceptable sense of that term, can be depended upon to operate only on 
that group of citizens to whom [the fee] will seem neither a prohibitive 
sum, nor, on the other hand, a trifling amount to pay for the privilege of 
demanding one's rights." Id. 
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evaluate their claims" can serve as a "deterr ent 
mechanism". Supra at 17 (emphasis added). No matter how 
long a disqualified prisoner such as Appellant stops, no 
matter how carefully he thinks, and no matter how 
meritorious his claims, he will remain disqualified. It is 
simply not possible to deter frivolous filings that have 
already occurred. At a minimum, ther efore, the 
retrospective application of the thr ee strikes rule to past 
filings cannot further the statute's asserted deterrent 
purpose.42 
 
With respect to future filings, it is difficult to see how the 
three strikes rule functions solely as an economic deterrent. 
To be sure, another section of the PLRA is well calculated 
to have that effect. See 28 U.S.C.S 1915(b) (requiring 
prisoners with IFP suits to pay filing fee in installments, in 
lieu of prior practice of waiving fee). This section corrects 
the perceived problem of inmates filing suits with no 
financial consequences, while at the same time ensuring 
that the truly indigent prisoner will not be denied access to 
the courts solely because he lacks the requisite funds.43 
The disincentive supplied by the three strikes rule, on the 
other hand, is not purely economic. For the truly indigent, 
the rule threatens a loss of the fundamental right of access 
to the courts. This is in no sense a market-corr ecting 
economic deterrent.44 
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42. In the present case, according to the District Court, only one of 
Appellant's disqualifying dismissals occurred after the effective date of 
the PLRA. App. 20. 
43. See 28 U.S.C. S 1915(b)(4) (Supp. III 1997) (providing that "[i]n no 
event shall a prisoner be prohibited fr om bringing a civil action or 
appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the r eason that the prisoner 
has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing 
fee."). This saving provision is inapplicable to prisoners subject to 
section 
1915(g). 
 
44. The majority's discussion does not say how the three strikes rule is 
supposed to further deterrence. Instead, it seems to say that the three 
strikes rule is rationally related to its goal because it is within 
congressional power. See supra at 18 ("Preventing frequent filers from 
obtaining fee waivers is rationally related to the legitimate government 
interest of deterring frivolous lawsuits because `Congress is no more 
compelled to guarantee free access to federal courts than it is to provide 
unlimited access to them.' "). This is patently a non sequitur. 
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In any event, even assuming that the goal of deterring 
frivolous suits is a compelling governmental interest, and 
that the three strikes rule somehow furthers that goal, the 
statute nevertheless cannot withstand strict scrutiny 
because at best there is only a very poor fit between end 
and means. As a mechanism for deterring frivolous claims, 
section 1915(g) is both under- and over -inclusive. On the 
one hand, it leaves unchecked the flow of frivolous lawsuits 
filed by indigent non-prisoners and by prisoners and non- 
prisoners with sufficient funds.45 On the other hand, it cuts 
off non-frivolous claims filed by indigent prisoners within 
its scope. See supra at 10 ("In stark ter ms, . . . the I.F.P. 
privilege will not be available . . . no matter how 
meritorious subsequent claims may be.").46 These 
shortcomings precisely echo those of the pr epayment 
requirements disapproved in Green and its progeny.47 Cf. 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (state statute 
requiring reimbursement of cost of criminal appeal 
transcript only as to prisoners held unconstitutional: 
"Assuming a law enacted to [deter frivolous appeals] to be 
otherwise valid, the present statutory classification is no 
less vulnerable under the Equal Protection Clause when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. See, e.g., Mary Tushnet and Larry Y ackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real 
Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L. J. 1 (Oct. 1997) 
("[N]otably, the statute allows any prisoner who can pay the complete 
filing fee in advance to file as many frivolous or malicious lawsuits as 
she wants."). 
 
46. Compare Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (finding denial of constitutional 
right where blanket bar to IFP filings failed to "consider[ ] the effects 
on 
a legitimate claim"). 
 
47. Illustrating the "general inappropriateness of withdrawing the in 
forma pauperis privilege as a means to curtail. . . abuse", the Green 
court observed: 
 
        On the one hand, Green is totally free toflood the courts with 
paper 
        provided that he pays the going rate: or ders erecting financial 
        barriers are only as effective as the litigant is truly 
impoverished. On 
        the other hand, these restrictions are clumsily overinclusive: if 
        Green does not have the money to file a frivolous claim, he also 
does 
        not have the money to file a legitimate one. 
 
669 F.2d 779. 
 
                                41 
  
viewed in relation to that function. By imposing a financial 
obligation only upon inmates of institutions, the statute 
inevitably burdens many whose appeals, though 
unsuccessful, were not frivolous, and leaves untouched 
many whose appeals may have been frivolous indeed.") 
Moreover, much better targeted means are available to 
arrest chronic frivolous filings.48 
 
It is therefore not surprising that courts which have 
applied strict scrutiny have found section 1915(g) wanting. 
See Lyon, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S 1983 action alleging denial 
of participation in Jewish services and other r eligious 
practices);49 Ayers v. Norris , 43 F.Supp.2d 1039 (E.D. Ark. 
1999). See also Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604 (upholding section 
1915(g) under a rational basis test, but noting the court 
"might not believe [S 1915(g)] to be . . . even a prudent[ ] 
response to the problem presented").50 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
48. The injunction that apparently r emains in effect against Appellant, 
setting special filing preconditions in r esponse to his history of abuse, 
is 
but one example. See supra at 4. Another example is the PLRA's own 
provision for judicial screening. Under section 1915A, a court may review 
and assess the merit of a prisoner's claims befor e docketing. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1915A(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1997). These measures, directed at 
particular abusers and particular frivolous claims, are clearly more 
narrowly tailored to serve their pr oper end than the three strikes 
classification, which lumps good faith err or with abuse and stifles 
meritorious claims along with frivolous ones. See Lukens, The Prisoner 
Litigation Reform Act, 70 Temp. L. Rev. at 505-06 (observing that 
"Section 1915(g) . . . treats the prisoner who has filed otherwise 
meritorious claims, but failed to name the pr oper party, . . . in the 
same 
manner as the litigant who sued the President .. . for stealing the 
multiplication tables from him.") 
 
49. The District Court in Lyon noted that, unlike the traditional 
discretionary power of the courts to limit abusive litigation by an 
individual prisoner based on his particular cir cumstances, the "three 
dismissal rule" gave no consideration to, e.g., length of incarceration, 
number of meritorious actions, or "other pertinent information that 
might guide a federal court in properly limiting abuse . . . ." Lyon, 940 
F. Supp. at 1438. Applying a strict scrutiny review, the District Court 
held section 1915(g) violative of equal pr otection. The Eighth Circuit 
undertook no constitutional review, finding instead that the plaintiff 
lacked standing because he had sufficient funds. 
 
50. The majority's response that constitutional constraints require 
"neither a perfect nor even best availablefit" between statutory ends and 
 
                                42 
  
Because section 1915(g) is not narrowly tailor ed to serve 
a compelling governmental purpose, its substantial 
infringement of indigent prisoners' fundamental right of 
access to the courts, and of the constitutional rights at 
stake in the potential litigation thwarted ther eby, amounts 
to an unconstitutional deprivation of the equal pr otection of 
the laws and of the due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment.51 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 633 
(1996) ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more 
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek 
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal 
protection of the laws in the most literal sense.").52 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
means, supra at 18, quoting United States v. Mariani, 212 F.3d 761, 774 
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), is not entir ely apt. Section 1915(g) is not 
constitutionally deficient because it is mer ely imperfect or sub-optimal; 
rather, its very high degree of both under- and over-inclusiveness 
renders it an extremely poor fit. Cases such as Mariani, which permit a 
certain degree of under-inclusiveness in statutes that burden First 
Amendment rights, therefore do not advance the inquiry. In the context 
of an equal protection challenge to a bur den on access to the courts, the 
Supreme Court has found the same type of under - and over- 
inclusiveness at issue here to be constitutionally impermissible. See 
Rinaldi, supra at 41-42. 
 
51. This conclusion is in accord with an apparent consensus among 
commentators who have addressed the constitutionality of the PLRA's 
three strikes provision. See, e.g., Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, supra n. 36; Franklin, Three Strikes, supra n. 25; David C.Leven, 
Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1, 15 (Fall 
1999); Mary Tushnet and Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Ef fective Death Penalty Act and 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L. J. 1, 70 (Oct. 1997); Simone 
Schonenberger, Access Denied: The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 86 Ky. 
L. J. 457 (1997-1998); Catherine G. Patsos, The Constitutionality and 
Implications of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
205 (1998). 
 
52. In addition to its infirmity on equal protection grounds, section 
1915(g) raises troubling questions concer ning the constitutional 
prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, in that it 
operates as an extra-judicial punishment against an identified group 
based on their past conduct. As noted by the majority, the three strikes 
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rule seeks to deter prisoner litigation by "disqualifying frequent filers 
who have failed in the past to carefully evaluate their claims prior to 
filing." Supra at 17. Cf. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 
939, 947 (1997) (stating that a statute which "attaches a new disability, 
in respect to transactions . . . already past, must be deemed 
retrospective") (quoting Soc. for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 
F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (C.C.N.H. 1814) (Story, J.)). 
 
The Supreme Court has identified three r equirements for finding that 
a challenged statute is a bill of attainder: "specification of the 
affected 
persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial." Selective Service 
System v. Minnesota Public Interest Resear ch Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 
(1984). As to the first element, section 1915(g) plainly is directed 
toward 
"specifically designated persons or groups". Id., quoting United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965). The af fected prisoners are identified by 
an objectively ascertainable, immutable characteristic -- three or more 
prior "strikes" -- and are commonly r eferred to in cases and 
congressional debate by a common pejorative title ("frequent filers"). As 
to the second element, the majority appears to acknowledge a punitive 
purpose and effect: "Potentially negative consequences in federal courts 
. . . are precisely the consequences intended by Congress. The outcome 
predicted by Appellant [i.e., that a prisoner "could forever lose his 
ability 
to bring his suit as a practical matter"] is . .. exactly what Congress 
intended." Supra at 10-11. Cf. Green, 669 F.2d at 786 (characterizing as 
"simply punitive" a prepayment requirement which "is not geared to 
discerning whether each claim presents a new nonfrivolous issue" and 
whichs seeks to "deter" by "assum[ing]" that the affected prisoner "will 
not be able to meet the required filing fee"). Finally, as to the third 
element, section 1915(g) imposes its deprivation without any judicial 
trial. Cf. Lyon, 940 F. Supp. at 1438 (contrasting blanket bar of section 
1915(g) with particularized discretion attendant on judicial proceeding to 
limit abusive litigation). 
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